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SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE MEETS WITH IRAQI UN PERM REP
BAYATI

Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 26, immediately following her return from Iraq and the day after two major suicide bombs in Baghdad, Ambassador Rice met with Iraqi UN Permanent Representative Bayati. The discussion focused on the UN response to and U.S. support for Iraq's request for a UN envoy to be dispatched following the August 19 bombings. Rice relayed details of her October 23 meeting with PM Maliki in Baghdad, during which the PM agreed to receive senior UN official Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Oscar Fernandez-Taranco in Iraq on a "good offices" mission on behalf of the SYG to assess and receive Iraq's security concerns regarding its neighbors, provided he visits Iraq only and not neighbors. Rice underscored Taranco's mandate could not be a formal investigation, but rather an opportunity for the GOI to "provide information and evidence to Ban." Given the Sunday attacks, Bayati informed Rice that the GOI would transmit an additional letter from Iraqi FM Zebari to SYG Ban today to underscore the GOI request for a high-level envoy to "assess foreign interference in Iraq." End summary.

¶2. (C) Ambassador Rice met with Iraqi PermRep Bayati on October 26. After expressing condolences for the hundreds of innocent Iraqis killed and wounded during the October 25 bombings, the conversation focused on the continued GOI request for a UN emissary following the August 19 bombings. Rice relayed her discussion with PM Maliki in Baghdad on October 23, during which the PM agreed to receive senior UN official Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Oscar Fernandez-Taranco in Iraq on a "good offices" mission on behalf of the SYG to assess and receive Iraq's security concerns regarding its neighbors, provided he visits Iraq only and not neighbors. Rice underscored Taranco's mandate could not be a formal investigation, but rather an opportunity for the GOI to "provide information and evidence to Ban." Bayati did not have a readout from Baghdad of PM Maliki's meeting.

¶3. (C) Rice relayed that PM Maliki explained Iraq's goal as seeking an end to the flow of foreign fighters and money from Syria into Iraq. Rice advised that continued GOI emphasis on a UN role after the good offices mission concludes may be misplaced since the UN can not accomplish the stated GOI goal of ending Syrian influence in Iraq. Using the Hariri and Bhutto commissions as examples, Rice noted that these UN vehicles do not move swiftly, while the GOI needs something quickly. Plus, despite the Hariri commission, Syria continues to violate UNSCR 1701 and other obligations with impunity. Instead, she recommended Iraq and the US should together consider other measures to accomplish our shared goals. In response, Bayati noted that six years of bilateral work had not resulted in success and that UN pressure was required.

14. (U) Bayati informed Rice he would forward a new letter from FM Zebari to SYG Ban, again requesting a UN high-level envoy to "assess" - not to "investigate" - foreign interference in Iraq's security situation. Bayati read directly from the Arabic-language letter, which said that "before the UN did anything tangible" another attack mirroring that of August 19 had occurred on October 25, and that these attacks are seeking to "paralyze" the GOI. Rice noted that when transmitting this new letter, the GOI should stress that UN A/S Taranco should come to Iraq immediately in fulfillment of the Iraqi request.

15. (C) Rice relayed that during her meeting with PM Maliki, she again offered USG support in the Security Council on Chapter VII issues on either a wholesale basis or individually. She told Bayati that the PM would consider whether to draft a letter of commitment on WMD issues, but did not seem ready to move yet on Kuwaiti-related issues. Rice also asked Bayati to clarify the Oil-for-Food (OFF) issue to his government, since PM Maliki did not understand the problem with Russia when Rice brought it up in discussion. She re-emphasized that the GOI should treat OFF as a bilateral issue with Russia.
Rice